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The Effect of IFRS Enforcement Factors on Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts Accuracy  
Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of IFRS mandatory adoption by French companies on analysts’ 
earnings forecast accuracy. In addition, we consider the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms, as IFRS enforcement factors, on earnings forecasts. Using a sample of 98 
companies over the period from 2003 to 2007, our results show increased forecast accuracy 
after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. We also find that the independence, the international 
competency and the efficiency of the board members, the board size, and the quality of external 
audit are important factors for the implementation of IFRS and, these factors improve earnings 
forecast accuracy.  
 
1- Introduction: 
There is an increasing debate about the impact of international financial reporting standards 
(IFRS) mandatory adoption on earning quality. At the time of this study more than 120 countries 
permit or require publicly traded companies to use IFRS. In this context, the European Union 
(EU) has taken the first initiative of harmonization by the implementation of Seventh Directive 
for consolidated accounts. The second essay on harmonization was decided by Regulation 
1606/2002 of 16 July 2002 that impose European listed companies to adopt international GAAP 
produced by the IASB (International Accounting Standards Board) a private organization  
(Chiapello, 2005; Jermakowicz and Gornick - Tomaszewski, 2006). Furthermore, in the United 
States (US) the security exchange commission has allowed foreign companies to use IFRS 
instead of reconciling their financial statements to US generally accepted accounting principles 
(SEC, 2010). This study aims to examine the impact of IFRS mandatory adoption on the quality 
of financial statements. In particular, we examine factors that contribute to the enforcement of 
IFRS and consequently to the improvement of analyst’s earnings forecasts accuracy.  
Disclosure quality has attracted the interest of both academics and professional accountants in 
various contexts, especially when they adopt international accounting standards. Accounting 
literature show several approaches that could be used to investigate the impact of international 
standard on disclosure quality. Some authors analyse the effect of different standards on the 
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value relevance that measure by information asymmetry. (Leuz, 2003; Daske, 2006; Armstrong 
et al, 2010). Other research has examined the impact of IFRS on reliability of financial 
disclosure that approximate by earnings management (Zimmerman and Goncharov, 2007; Titas 
and Dipanjan, 2012). A final approach to analyse IFRS effectiveness consider its effect on 
comparability. (DeFond et al, 2011; Jones and Finley, 2011). Moreover, previous literature has 
concentrated mainly on the effect of IFRS voluntary adoption by German companies (Barth et 
al, 2008; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005) on earning quality focusing on the properties 
of earnings (e.g. earnings management) and where IFRS enforcement factors are not controlled 
for (Zimmerman and Goncharov, 2007; Titas and Dipanjan, 2012). This research contributes to 
this debate by examining the effect of IFRS mandatory adoption on forecast earnings accuracy 
by analysts a sophisticated users of financial statements. As an aggregate measure of 
performance, earnings number is one of the most important items disclosed by firms. It allows 
decision makers, especially analysts, to evaluate a firm efficiency, its financial and competitive 
position. Considering the analysts’ earnings forecasts accuracy as a direct measure of the 
usefulness of accounting information which is an important qualitative characteristic (IASB 
Framework, Jiao et al, 2012), we use this variable to approximate earnings quality.  
Since the majority of studies focuses on the US stock exchange markets and investigates the 
effect of cross listings on the properties of analyst’s forecasts (Lang et al, 2003; Ciccone, 2005; 
Heflin et al, 2003), we address this issue in the setting of French capital market where IFRS are 
mandatorily adopted by all European Union (EU) listed companies.  France is a code law 
country characterized by regulatory rigidity and a legalistic prospect that differs largely from 
international accounting standard marked by conceptual framework that protects shareholder 
interests. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study examining the effect of IFRS on 
analysts’ forecast accuracy in the French market. In this sense, this paper is one of the first to 
study whether the analysts’ earnings forecasts accuracy increases in France capital market 
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following mandatory IFRS adoption, and conditions and enforcement factors that let increases 
to occur.  
Furthermore, previous research shows that the implementation of international accounting 
system reinforces the quality of financial reporting by meeting the information needs of 
investors (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Iatridis, 2010). 
Nevertheless, earnings quality cannot be determined by the quality of accounting standards 
alone because their implementation requires judgment (Ball et al, 2000; Burgstahler et al., 2006). 
In fact, companies operating in the same economic context report financial earnings of 
significantly different quality (Watrin and Ullmann, 2012). So, our research contributes to this 
debate by examining factors that have entailed the enforcement of IFRS and improved the 
quality of financial reports.  
Overall, we extend prior research in two principles ways:  
I-  First, we test the impact of IFRS on analysts’ earnings forecasts in France, a code-law 
country, which has undergone a major switch from following the stakeholder- oriented 
to the shareholder-oriented accounting system.   
 
II- Second, while previous studies examined the effect of institutional differences across 
countries on reporting quality (Ball et al, 2003; Lang et al, 2003; Bushman et Piotroski, 
2006), we point out how IFRS enforcement factors influence earnings quality. So, we 
investigate at the firm level by choosing a sample of firms that are subject to the same 
institutional framework. 
Our findings show improvements in the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts after 
mandatory IFRS adoption. In addition, the board independence, international competency and 
efficiency, the quality of external audit and the board size are important factors of IFRS 
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implementation and consequently contribute to the improvement of disclosure quality. These 
results are relevant to the debate on the decision of the current mandatory switch to a single set 
of accounting standards in Europe. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
framework and the development of the research hypotheses. The third section explains the 
research design. The results are reported and discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes our 
paper and provides suggestions for further research. 
2- Theoretical frameworks and hypotheses development: 
Two theoretical frameworks can be used in this paper to explain the effect of IFRS enforcement 
factors on analyst’s earnings forecasts. These are agency theory and signalling theory.  
   2.1 Agency theory: 
The agency theory is formalised by Jensen and Meckling (1976) to highlight both the agency 
relationship between shareholders, creditors and managers and interest conflict that arise from 
the separation of ownership and control of public companies. This theory considers the firm as 
organisational form searching to reduce agency conflicts and costs involved. Based upon 
agency theory, disseminating high quality accounting and financial information is commonly 
used by firms to reduce agency costs.  
Furthermore, this theory is implicitly proposed as a framework by IASB. In fact, the IFRS 
conceptual framework acknowledges that investors are privileged financial users (Colasse, 
2006). It encourages firms to enhance the transparency and the level of financial information 
disclosed in order to limit discretionary power of managers, and earnings forecasted will be 
improved as a result. Moreover, corporate governance mechanisms are established by 
shareholders in order to align managers’ actions with shareholders’ interest. That’s why many 
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previous empirical research (Zéghal et al, 2011; Hussainey and Al Najjar, 2011; Tauringana 
and Mangena, 2009) focus on this settlement as determinants of high quality disclosure in 
accordance with agency theory. 
2.2 Signalling theory:  
It is argued that there are several similarities between agency theory and signalling theory 
(Morris, 1987; Sun et al, 2010). Signalling theory was developed by Akerlof (1970) to alleviate 
problems due to the existence of information asymmetry in the capital markets. These problems 
may be reduced when the party who detains more information signals it to other parties less 
informed. The reduction of uncertainty and information asymmetry would improve the 
communication between managers and other interested parties such as shareholders, regulatory 
and supervisory authorities, lenders, financial analysts, etc. This allows, therefore, reducing the 
related agency costs that might otherwise arise (Healy and Palepu, 2001). That’s why signalling 
prospects can be considered as explaining the agency theory assumptions. 
Furthermore, IFRS are issued by IASB in order “to develop, in the public interest, a single set 
of high quality, understandable and enforceable global accounting standards that require high 
quality, transparent and comparable information in financial statements and other financial 
reporting to help participants in the world's capital markets and other users make economic 
decisions” (Epstein and Mirza, 2002). The EU objective of mandating IFRS was to improve the 
capital market functioning. In fact, the implementation of IFRS, a single set of high quality 
accounting standards, would lead to more transparent financial reports and reduce the 
information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors (Armstrong et al, 2010; 
Jiao et al, 2012). Hence, the IFRS adoption and enforcement could be considered as positive 
signal to the stakeholders as information disclosed under international standards is of high 
quality and improves analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
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       2.3 Impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on analysts’ earnings forecasts accuracy: 
Earnings number is the summary measure on which analysts, the most important users of 
financial reports, focus (Barker and Imam, 2008; Dechow et al 1998). 
Thereby, to infer the effect of IFRS mandatory adoption on earning quality, we use analysts 
forecast properties rather than earning properties measure such as earnings management largely 
used in last research. 
A wide literature has addressed the issue of relation between financial reporting quality and 
analysts’ forecast accuracy. Most research in this field provides evidence that increased 
disclosure level1 is associated with decrease of information asymmetry and hence higher analyst 
forecast accuracy (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Hope, 2003). Also, the increased disclosure 
quality decreases the information asymmetry (Healey and Palepu, 2001; Frankel and Li, 2004; 
Watrin and Ullmann, 2012). Financial statements are the most important source of information 
for different users, particularly, the financial analysts (Capstaff et al, 1995; Barron et al, 2002; 
Barker and Imam, 2008). This implies that any change in accounting information related to the 
transition from domestic GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) to IFRS, is 
reflected in the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. 
A growing body of literature claimed that IFRS is a high quality accounting standard allowing 
transparency and credibility of financial reports (Ball et al., 2003; Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen, 2005; Kohlbech and Warfield, 2010). Using different methods of measuring 
financial information quality, several studies investigate the effect of IFRS adoption on 
disclosure quality. Indeed, approximating earning quality by earnings management and 
timeliness of losses, Iatridis (2010) finds that the adoption of IFRS is related to a decreased 
                                                          
1 Level of disclosure is considered as proxy of disclosure quality (Botosan, 1997; Beattie et al, 2002) 
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earnings management, more timely loss recognition and consequently higher value relevance 
of financial disclosure for British companies. In addition, Barth et al (2008) report a decrease 
in the practice of earnings management after the switch to IFRS. Nevertheless, other studies, 
focused on earnings management and timeliness of losses, report a decrease of accounting 
quality after transition to IFRS (Ahmed et al, 2013; Chen et al, 2010; JeanJean and Stolowy, 
2008). Based on a sample of Indian firms, Titas and Dipanjan (2012) find a negative 
relationship between the adoption of IFRS and earnings management. Hence, the earnings 
management practice increases significantly after IFRS transition. 
Examining the literature on the effect of IFRS adoption on analysts’ earnings forecasts provides 
mixed evidence. Dask (2005) evidence shows lower accuracy and higher dispersion among 
analysts’ forecasts for German firms which adopted international accounting standards before 
mandatory period. In addition, Bae et al (2008) find evidence that the extent to which local 
GAAP differs from IFRS are negatively associated with analysts’ forecasts accuracy in the post-
IFRS adoption period. However, by measuring investor response to earnings, some prior 
research document numerous capital benefits of IFRS adoption including reduced cost of capital 
and improved liquidity (Li, 2010; Daske et al, 2008),  greater analyst following and reduced 
analyst forecast dispersion (Horton and Serafeim, 2010; Tan et al 2011). In addition, Byard et 
al (2011) study the variation of the forecast error committed by analysts after IFRS adoption. 
They find a decrease of the absolute error value showing that accounting information is 
becoming more relevant. This decrease is very significant for IFRS mandatory adopting 
countries whose local GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) are widely different 
from those of the IASB conceptual framework. These results were confirmed by Armstrong et 
al (2010) concerning the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the European context. These authors 
examine the reaction of financial market to sixteen events related to the adoption of IFRS in 
Europe. They find that investors expect an incrementally improvement in the value relevance 
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of financial disclosure after the mandatory transition to IFRS. In addition they conclude that 
financial market reacts positively to any event promoting the adoption of IFRS. 
Voulgaris et al (2014) examine the effect of IFRS on the type of performance measures that 
firms use to evaluate and reward their managers. Their findings suggest that, while under IFRS, 
accounting earnings could be more informative for valuation purposes, this might be achieved 
at the expense of other purposes that accounting serves such as stewardship or performance 
contracting. 
 Using a sample of 19 European countries where UK firms are the most represented2, Jiao et al 
(2012) analyzed the effect of IFRS mandatory adoption on analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. 
They document that analysts’ earnings forecasts have become more accurate and less dispersed 
after IFRS switch. So, researchers conclude that international standards allow an improvement 
in the value relevance of disclosure. 
La Bruslerie and Gabteni (2014) investigated the relationship between mandatory and voluntary 
information and whether the introduction of IFRS influenced the content and level of 
discretionary information disclosed by firms. Referring to 2003-2008 period gives a long term 
perspectives and allow them to identify communication policy. Their results show that 
voluntary disclosure policies improve with the introduction of IFRS. This study also shows that, 
after IFRS, the discretionary communication policies of French firms follow both a long term 
and short term component to meet analysts’ demand for information permitting an increase in 
earning’s forecasts accuracy. 
Following this literature, it is clear that the question relating to the impact of IFRS on financial 
statement disclosure quality was subject of controversies. Accordingly, if the transparency and 
                                                          
2 UK firms represent 37% of the sample 
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the value relevance of financial statements improve under IFRS, more accurate information will 
be available to analysts which might lead to an improvement in analysts’ earnings forecasts 
accuracy (Tong, 2007; Cheong et al, 2010). 
Our first objective in this research is to investigate the impact of IFRS mandatory adoption on 
analysts’ earnings forecasts in France a code law country. To achieve this objective, we assume 
that IFRS mandatory adoption helps analysts in forecasting future earnings. Thus our first 
hypothesis is:  
    H1: The mandatory adoption of IFRS in France improves the analysts’ earnings 
forecasts accuracy. 
 
2.4 IFRS enforcement factors: 
Much attention in current accounting research3 is given to the effect of accounting standard 
especially the international standards on disclosure quality. Nevertheless, the quality of 
financial statements does not depend on the quality of these standards alone. Indeed, the quality 
of disclosure could be attributed to both the quality of IFRS and their high enforcement and 
implementation (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; Ball et al, 2003; Li, 2010, Byard et al, 
2011). Moreover, Hail and Leuz (2010) and Barth et al (2008) suggest that lax enforcement of 
IFRS may lead to a lower compliance to these standards, which therefore limits their 
effectiveness in improving the quality of disclosure. 
Schipper (2005, P106) states that: “The quality of financial reporting is crucially dependent on 
vigorous enforcement that is separate from the financial reporting standard setting function”. 
                                                          
3 Zimmerman and Goncharov (2007), Titas and Dipanjan (2012), DeFond et al (2011), Jones 
and Finley (2011) 
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Hence, we can deduce that the quality of IFRS is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
obtain high disclosure quality.  
Daske et al (2008) document heterogeneity across firms in the economic effects of IFRS 
adoption. This heterogeneity is related either to differences in firms reporting incentives or 
corporate governance factors.  In addition, Jones and Finley (2011) suggest that in the absence 
of effective enforcement, the major impact of IFRS on decreasing international reporting 
diversity could be much reduced. Also, Brown and Tarca (2005) emphasize the need of 
appropriate enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with IFRS.  
Alali and Foote (2012) support the regulatory initiative of compliance and enforcement of IFRS 
such as governance system in order to better financial reporting transparency and trust which 
let analysts more associated with accounting information than speculations and rumors. 
Furthermore, Zéghal et al (2011) examine whether mandatory adoption of IFRS by French 
companies is related to lower earnings management. They also analyse two categories of 
enforcement factors of IFRS: corporate governance and dependence on international markets. 
They find that mandatory adoption of IFRS has reduced significantly the level of earnings 
management for firms with good corporate governance and those depending on foreign 
financial markets. 
Similar to Zéghal et al (2011) we contribute to this literature by examining the corporate 
governance as IFRS enforcement factors and its impact on improving earnings forecast 
accuracy after IFRS mandatory adoption .   
An extensive amount of research has examined the effect of corporate governance on financial 
reporting quality (Bédard et al, 2004; Peasnell et al, 2005; Jiraporn and Gleason, 2007; Zéghal 
et al, 2011; Verriest et al, 2013). The board of directors is often considered as one of the most 
important corporate governance and its control role in firms is essential and depends on several 
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attributes as board size, separation of the role of CEO and board chairman, independence and 
competency of board members and existence of an independent audit committee (Zhara and 
Pearce, 1989; Vafeas, 1999). 
Firms with more independent boards are likely to engage in less fraud or earnings management 
and are found to have better reporting quality (Xie et al, 2003; Jiraporn and Cleason, 2007; 
Peasnell et al, 2005; Beasley, 1996; Bédard et al, 2004). Moreover, Wang and Campbell (2012) 
declare that the number of independent board members significantly decreases earnings 
management for companies without state ownership. 
Ebrahim (2007) finds that the relationship between board independence and earnings 
management is more significant for more active boards, as measured by the frequency of annual 
board meetings. Empirical evidence by Marra et al (2011) indicates that, under international 
standards, independent board and audit committee play significant role in decreasing earnings 
management. 
Audit committee effectiveness and independence is positively associated with financial 
reporting quality (Klein, 2002) and negatively related with fraud (Carcello et al, 2011; Abott et 
al, 2004). 
The Viénot’s reports 1995, 1999 in France recommend the separation of decision- making and 
control role. In addition, a number of research papers has found a bad effect on financial 
statement quality of combination of the two functions (Peasnell et al, 2005; Beasley, 1996; 
Bédard et al, 2004). 
Another characteristic that seems to have a significant influence on the board’s performance 
and efficiency is the board size. Results of research that has focused on the influence of board 
size on financial statement quality are mixed. Some studies find a positive relation between the 
number of directors and disclosure quality (Xie et al, 2003; Kent and Stewart, 2008; Zéghal et 
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al, 2011). In contrast, other studies indicate that smaller boards are more efficient in monitoring 
management, reducing managerial discretion and improving disclosure quality (Beasley, 1996). 
From an agency theory view, larger board is an effective corporate governance mechanism in 
monitoring managers. 
Board of directors needs to be active and to meet frequently in order to carry out its role of 
monitoring and ensuring high-quality and transparent reporting in annual reports (Xie et al, 
2003; Conger et al, 1998; Vafeas, 1999). Using a sample of Australian listed companies, Kent 
and Stewart (2008) find that companies with more frequent board meeting have more disclosure 
after IFRS transition.  
Furthermore external audit quality is also a guarantee of control management effectiveness and 
a very important factor for good corporate governance. In fact, Tsalavoutas (2011), Iatridis 
(2011) and Dimitropoulos et al (2013) indicate that IFRS compliance is positively associated 
with audit quality.  
Prior studies focus on the post IFRS period to analyze the effect of corporate governance on the 
financial statement quality. In this sense, Goodwin et al (2009) find that companies with 
stronger governance show lower managerial forecast errors stemming from IFRS adoption in 
Australia.     
Previous literature has also considered the importance of international experience of board 
members (Luo, 2005). A company with high internationally competent board members has the 
opportunity to reduce the information costs of globalization. Holm et al (2012) state that IFRS 
implementation is related to the board international competency and professional background 
in accounting and finance. International experience and competence can be accomplished by 
native board members that have board membership subsidiaries or by including foreign 
members on the board. 
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Verriest et al (2013) investigate the relation between corporate governance and financial 
reporting quality for first time IFRS adopters. They state that (P66): “Stronger governance firms 
engage in more transparent IFRS restatements, provide better disclosure quality and comply 
with IFRS more rigorously than weaker governance firms.” Their results show also that firms 
with better functioning and independent board and more effective audit committees publish 
higher quality financial statements. 
Similarly, Zéghal et al (2011) show that the independence and effectiveness of the board, the 
existence of  an independent audit committee, the quality of external audit and the dependence 
on foreign financial markets are important factors for the implementation of IFRS in France. 
From an agency perspective and based on previous research evidence, we predict that 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in France has greater and positive effect on analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy when firms have stronger corporate governance mechanisms. Thus our 
second hypothesis is: 
H2: The mandatory adoption of IFRS leads to a better improvement in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts accuracy when firm’s corporate governance is strong and effective. 
This hypothesis can be broken down as follow: 
     H2-1 The mandatory adoption of IFRS leads to a better improvement in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts accuracy when a firm’s board of directors is independent 
competent and active. 
   H2-2 The mandatory adoption of IFRS leads to a better improvement in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts accuracy when there is separation of the roles of CEO and board 
chairman.  
    H2-3 The mandatory adoption of IFRS leads to a better improvement in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts accuracy when a firm’s audit committee is independent. 
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  H2-4 The mandatory adoption of IFRS leads to a better improvement in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts accuracy when external audit is of high quality. 
  H2-5: The board of directors’ size has a positive effect on improving analysts’ 
earnings forecasts accuracy after mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
3- Empirical Research: 
 In this section, we first provide a description of the data and variables applied. Second, we 
present the models used to test the hypothesis developed in the previous sections. 
   3.1 Sample: 
The sample is drawn from the population of French non-financial groups listed on the French 
stock exchange during the period before mandatory adoption of IFRS (2003-2004) and the 
period after mandatory adoption of IFRS (2006-2007). Similar to Zéghal et al (2011) and Jiao 
et al (2012), we eliminate the transitory year 2005 because firms reports differently according 
to IFRS1 that allows many exemptions in order to facilitate transition to international standards. 
In addition, we study the period before 2008, date of financial crisis, to avoid its effects on the 
implementation of international standards and the application of fair value assessment. 
The principal sources of data were obtained from annual reports available in the SBF 250 and 
from the IBES databases. Financial companies (41) are excluded because of their specific 
regulation and their special accounting practices. Also, we have excluded firms without a 
December 31 fiscal year-end (50), firms publishing their financial statements under IFRS before 
2004 (6), firms without necessary data to calculate forecast accuracy (55). The final sample 
consists of 98 companies. 
 
 3.2 Data and variables: 
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Data are referred to corporate governance attributes particularly board of directors characteristic 
and analyst information for French publicly traded companies. 
Forecast Error: the dependent variable in our study is the accurateness of forecasts. 
Nevertheless, following previous research (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001; Jiao et al, 2012) we 
use the reverse of accuracy namely forecast error to measure forecast accuracy. Forecast error 
is determined as the absolute value of the difference between final consensus earnings forecast 
and real earning scaled by the stock price at the end of one year before the forecasted year  
     FE =         Consensus.forecastt, i – Real EPS  
                                                            P t-1, i 
EPS: earning per share 
Consensus forecast retained in our study is the final one and is defined as the average of 
available analyst earning forecast just before the announcement of annual earnings. Data 
concerning this variable is obtained from the database IBES. We examine the effect of our 
hypotheses on the forecast error through the following independent variables: 
 IFRS a dummy variable coded as 1 for years after 2005 and 0 otherwise. 
 Size (ln Assets): it has been argued in prior research that large firms are widely followed 
by analysts. Indeed, they are expected to be more transparent, disclosing more reliable 
information and providing financial analysts with access to some private information, 
which in turn lead to more accurate earning forecast (Brown et al, 1987; Hope, 2003; Lang 
and Lundholm, 1996; Jiao et al, 2012). The proxy for firm size is the natural logarithm of 
total assets [ln assets] (Godard, 2002; Fernández and Arrondo, 2005). 
 
 Performance volatility (σROE): earning forecast accuracy is largely affected by the 
volatility of firm’s performance. Indeed, it is not easy to predict a profit when firm 
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performance is volatile. Therefore, it is likely that the accuracy of forecasts is lower for 
firms with more volatile performance. Hence we include this variable to control the 
performance volatility effect. This variable is calculated as standard deviation of return on 
equity (ROE) based on the five years before the forecast year (Jiao et al, 2012). 
 
 Number of analyst forecast (NEstimate): another variable that permit to control the 
analyst forecast accuracy is analyst following. In fact, the forecast accuracy improves when 
the number of analysts increases as there is more competition among them and, therefore, 
analysts will be more encouraged to forecast accurately (Lys and Soo, 1995; Jiao et al, 
2012). Hence, it is expected that this variable will be negatively correlated with forecast 
errors. Following this studies, we measure this variable using natural logarithm of the 
number of analysts’ forecast included in the final consensus from IBES. 
 
 Board of directors attributes are measured as: 
 
 International competency(COMPETENT): Holm et al (2012) coded as 1 if one or 
more members of the board have international experience such as board membership in 
foreign firms and 0 otherwise. Due to the lack of variability, this variable will be 
measured by the percentage of foreign directors or board membership in foreign firms. 
According to prior studies (Holm et al, 2012; Verriest et al, 2013), it is expected that 
this variable will be positively correlated with earnings forecasts accuracy.  
 Independence of board (INDEP): the independence of board members improve the 
disclosure quality (Xie et al, 2003; Jiraporn and Cleason, 2007; Bédard et al, 2004). 
Hence, it is likely that this variable is positively associated with earnings forecasts 
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accuracy. We measure board independence by the percentage of independent external 
directors serving on the board. (Abott et al, 2004; Beasley, 1996; Peasnell, 1995). 
 Independent audit committee (AUDIT COM): based on previous literature, it is 
expected that this variable will be positively correlated with earning quality and, 
particularly with the accuracy of earnings forecasts (Klein, 2002; Carcello et al, 2011; 
Abott et al, 2004, Xie et al, 2003; Zéghal et al, 2011; Holm et al, 2012). The same studies 
allow us to code this variable as 1 if the company has established an independent audit 
committee and 0 otherwise.   
 Separation of the roles of CEO and board chairman (SEP): following previous 
studies (Beasley, 1996; Peasnell et al, 2005; Xie et al, 2003), separation of the roles of 
CEO and chairman of the board was measured by a dummy variable that take 1 if there 
is separation of function and 0 otherwise. 
 External audit quality (EXT.AUDIT): Big 4 auditors have more knowledge, 
specialized personnel and IFRS-related experience and show higher requirement for 
compliance with accounting regulation and for higher accounting quality in financial 
reporting. Moreover, they could provide greater assistance in the implementation and 
transition to IFRS compared to other audit firms. Hence, they should be considered as 
IFRS enforcement factors and contribute to the improvement of earning forecast 
accuracy. (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Van Tendeloo et Vanstraelen, 2005; Zéghal 
et al, 2011; Iatridis, 2011; and Dimitropoulos et al, 2013). This study is conducted in 
the French context where legislation requires for companies to appoint two auditors. So, 
this variable will be coded as 1 if there is at least one big 4 that audited the firm; 0 
otherwise. This measure was also used by (Xie et al, 2003; Zéghal et al, 2011; Iatridis, 
2011).      
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 B.Size: From an agency perspective, larger boards are more efficient in monitoring 
management, reducing managerial discretion and improving disclosure quality. We, 
therefore, expect that board size will be positively associated with earnings forecasts 
accuracy.  According to previous studies (Xie et al., 2003; Bédard et al., 2004; Zéghal 
et al, 2011), board size (B.SIZE) was measured by the number of directors serving in 
the board. 
 Frequency: board activity, measured by the number of board meeting. Frequency is an 
important dimension of board efficiency. Vafeas (1999) show that operating 
performance improves following years of abnormal board activity. Xie et al (2003) 
argue that board meeting frequency is an important factor in constraining the propensity 
of managers to engage in earnings management. Hence, we expect that board activity 
will be positively associated with earning quality disclosed. 
 Industry and Year Dummies: we also include industry and year dummies to control 
for unobservable factors associated with the characteristics of industries and years that 
might influence the analyst’s forecast accuracy. 
 
 3.3 Models  
    In order to examine if mandatory adoption of IFRS improves the analysts’ forecast accuracy 
the following model was estimated.    
       M1: FE t,i = α0 + α1 IFRS t,i + α2 ln Assets t,i+ α 3 N.Estimate t,i +  α 4σROE t−1, i+      α 
5 Industry Dummies t, i + α 6 Year Dummies t, i +ε t,i.   
 
To test our second hypothesis, we estimate the Model 2  
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M2: FE t,i = β0 + β1 IFRS t,i + β2 ln Assets t,i + β3 N.Estimate t,i + β4 σROE t,i +                       β5 
INDEP t,i + β6 COMPETENT t,i + β7 AUDIT.COM t,i + β8 B.Size t,i + β9 SEP t,i + 
β10EXT.AUDITt,i + β11 Frequencyt,i + β12 (IFRS*INDEP)t,i+                                           β13 
(IFRS* COMPETENT) t,i + β14 (IFRS*AUDIT.COM) t , i +    β15 (IFRS*B.Size)t,i + β16 
(IFRS*SEP)t,i + β17 (IFRS*EXT.AUDIT)t,i +   β18 (IFRS*Frequency) t,i +                        β19  
Industry Dummies t, i + β20 Year Dummies t, i + ε i.t 
We summarize the definition of variables in the table below. 
Variables Definition  Expected 
sign 
Forecast Error Forecast Error is the error in analysts' consensus 
forecasts. It is the absolute difference between 
the consensus forecast of EPS and actual EPS 
scaled by the stock price at the end of year t−1 
 
IFRS IFRS is a dummy, which equals to 1 for years 
after 2005 and 0 
otherwise. 
- 
ln Assets It is a firm’s size - 
N.Estimate N.Estimate stands for the number of estimations 
contained in consensus forecasts. 
- 
σROE It is a variable control for the volatility of firm 
performance. 
It is calculated as the standard deviation of ROE 
based on the five years before year t 
+ 
INDEP Independence of board members measured by 
the percentage of independent external directors 
serving on the board 
- 
COMPETENT International competency coded as 1 if one or 
more members of the board have international 
experience such as board membership in foreign 
firms and 0 otherwise. 
- 
AUDIT.COM Independent audit committee is code this 
variable as 1 if the company has established an 
independent audit committee and 0 otherwise.   
 
- 
B. Size Board size measured by the number of directors 
serving in the board. 
 
- 
SEP Separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman of 
the board was measured by a dummy variable 
- 
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that take 1 if there is separation of function and 0 
otherwise. 
 
EXT.AUDIT External audit quality approximated by Big 4. 
This variable will be coded as 1 if there is at 
least one big 4 that audited the firm; 0 
otherwise. 
- 
Frequency Board activity, measured by the number of board 
meeting. 
- 
IFRS* INDEP 
            Competent 
            AUDIT COM 
             B.Size 
             SEP 
             EXT.AUDIT 
             Frequency 
 
Interaction term between the IFRS variable and 
each corporate governance attributes. These 
variables are included to highlight the factors that 
contribute to the implementation and 
enforcement of IFRS. 
 
- 
 
 
4- Results: 
This section, present the empirical results relating to the first hypothesis. Next, we present 
the results of our second model testing the second hypothesis. 
     4.1 Analysis of results relating to the first hypothesis: 
  4.1.1 Comparison of forecast accuracy in the PRE and POST IFRS mandatory adoption: 
Our first hypothesis to be tested is that mandatory adoption of IFRS in France improves 
the analyst’s forecast accuracy. Hence, we compare forecast accuracy level between two 
periods: the period before mandatory IFRS (PRE.IFRS: 2003-2004) and the period after 
mandatory adoption of IFRS (POST.IFRS: 2006-2007). 
We begin this analysis by checking the normality of variable in order to choose the 
appropriate statistical test. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test show that the dependent variable 
“forecast error” doesn’t follow the normal law. So, we used the Wilcoxon non parametric 
test of mean equality. 
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Table 1 
Forecast error: test of difference between PRE and POST 
     Mean  
PRE. IFRS 
       Mean 
POST.IFRS 
Wilcoxon test P-Value 
FE(Forecast error) 0.0471 0.0132 11.829*** 0.000 
 
The results of this test are presented in table 1. 
Table 1 shows that mean of forecast error for the POST.IFRS period is significantly smaller 
than for the PRE.IFRS period. 
Therefore, on average, the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts increases after the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS by French companies. 
  4.1.2 Multivariate tests of forecast accuracy PRE and Post IFRS: 
    4.1.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables. On average, earnings forecasts accuracy 
is about 2% of stock prices, which is in line with prior studies (Bae et al, 2008; Jiao et al, 2012). 
The number of analysts forecasts ranges from 3 to 45 with on average 10 forecasts underlying 
a consensus forecast. On average, the earnings volatility is about 0.16 with a Min of 0.001 and 
a Max of 13. The earnings volatility is low; hence it is expected that this variable has no effect 
on earnings forecast accuracy. 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
  Variables  Obs  Mean Min Max Std deviation 
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FE(Forecast error) 392 0.0200698 0.0000549 0.9039548 0.0829078 
ln Assets  392 20.97527 10.77553 27.12777 2.781205 
σROE 392 0.1578444 0.001 12.70317 0.8841007 
NEstimate 392 10.75719 3.000000 45.00000 2.114951 
 
Table 3 presents the correlations between the independent variables. The number of estimations 
contained in consensus forecasts is negatively associated with σROE and positively and 
significantly associated with companies size (ln assets) which is in line with prior researches 
suggesting that large firms are highly followed by analysts (Jiao et al, 2012).  
Table 3: Correlation matrix 
 FE IFRS ln Assets σROE NEstimate 
FE 1     
IFRS -0.2055*** 1    
ln Assets -0.1940* 0.0795* 1   
σROE  0.2204** -0.0802** -0.1396 1  
NEstimate -0.1313*** 0.0409* 0.3775** -0.0076 1 
In addition, Table 3 presents the correlations between independent and dependent variables. 
Correlation reports that forecast error is negatively correlated with firm size and analyst 
coverage (NEstimate). This result is consistent with previous studies suggesting that analysts’ 
forecasts are more accurate for firms with high analyst following and for large firms (Lang and 
Landholm, 1996; Lys and Soo, 1995; Jiao et al, 2012). Furthermore, the coefficient of variable 
“IFRS” is negative which indicates that after mandatory IFRS adoption, analysts’ forecasts 
accuracy are better. Moreover, the positive correlation between forecast error and the 
performance volatility (σROE) is expected. In fact, as the performance volatility is high as the 
earnings forecasts are less accurate. The correlations are relatively low suggesting the absence 
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of multicollinearity in the multivariate regression. We also calculate Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIFs) to determine the severity of multicollinearity in the subsequent regression analyses. VIFs 
above ten indicate a serious multicollinearity problem (Belsley et al, 1980). We find that none 
of the VIFs are above two, which shows that multicollinearity does not pose problem to our 
regression analyses. 
4.1.2.2 Results of regression analysis: 
Table 4 presents the results of regression analysis in 2003 to 2007. Regression 1 shows that 
IFRS has a negative and significant (at the level 10%) effect on analyst forecast error. In fact, 
the coefficient of this variable is (-0.0302). This implies that the analysts’ forecast accuracy 
increases after mandatory adoption of IFRS by French companies. Regression 2 presents the 
results controlling for Industry Dummies. Regression 3 presents the results controlling for both 
Industry Dummies and Year Dummies effects. From the first regression to the third one, IFRS 
is negative and significant at the level 10% and increases in magnitude. Overall, the findings 
are consistent with our previous results showing that IFRS mandatory adoption improve the 
level of earnings forecasts accuracy (Zéghal et al, 2011; Jiao et al, 2012; Tan et al 2011; La 
Bruslerie and Gabteni, 2014). They are also in line with both agency and signalling theory 
suggesting that the improvement of disclosure quality in the financial statement after IFRS 
mandatory adoption reduces the asymmetry information which better the analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy. Consequently, we can conclude that our first hypothesis is accepted: 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in France improves the analysts’ forecasts accuracy. 
 
 
Table 4: Regression Results Model 1 
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 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
IFRS  -0.0302* 
(0.0053) 
-0.0303* 
(0.0053) 
-0.1768* 
(0.0058) 
ln Assets -0.0014 
(0.0025) 
-0.0015 
(0.0027) 
-0.0010 
(0.0027) 
σROE 0.0157*** 
(0.0039) 
0.0156*** 
(0.0039) 
0.0157*** 
(0.0039) 
NEstimate -0.0052* 
(0.0028) 
-0.0053* 
(0.0029) 
-0.0059** 
(0.0029) 
Const 0.1297** 
(0.0467) 
0.1484** 
(0.0740) 
0.1439* 
(0.0744) 
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No Yes 
Obs 392 392 392 
R. squared 0.1015 0.1231 0.1409 
Standard errors in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%, 
 
In addition, the results of three regressions show that the coefficient of performance volatility 
(σROE) is positive and significant at the 1% level. Therefore, volatility of performance has a 
negative and significant effect on analysts’ forecast accuracy. 
 Company size (ln assets) has a negative but insignificant effect on the analysts forecast 
accuracy. This finding is consistent with the study of Jiao et al (2012) and Lang and Lundholm 
(1996). Nevertheless, the number of analysts following (NEstimate) is negatively and 
significantly related to the earning forecast accuracy. According to prior studies’ findings (Lys 
and Soo, 1995; Jiao et al, 2012), this result shows that the increase in the analysts following 
improves the accuracy of forecast earning. 
4.2 Empirical findings relating to second hypothesis:  
In this section, we present model 2 used to test the second hypothesis. Then, we check for the 
absence of multicollinearity and finally we present the main results. 
4.2.1 Research model 
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We analyzed the following Model 2 in order to test our second hypothesis. 
M2: FE t,i = β0 + β1 IFRS t,i + β2 ln Assets t,i + β3 N.Estimate t,i + β4 σROE t,i +                       β5 
INDEP t,i + β6 COMPETENT t,i + β7 AUDIT.COM t,i + β8 B.Size t,i + β9 SEP t,i + 
β10EXT.AUDITt,i + β11 Frequencyt,i + β12 (IFRS* INDEP)t,i+                                           β13 
(IFRS* COMPETENT) t,i + β14 (IFRS*AUDIT.COM) t , i +    β15 (IFRS*B.Size)t,i + β16 
(IFRS*SEP)t,i + β17 (IFRS*EXT.AUDIT)t,i +   β18 (IFRS*Frequency) t,i +                        β19  
Industry Dummies t, i + β20 Year Dummies t, i + ε i.t 
4.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Independence of board members on average is 43%. The mean of board meeting frequency is 
about 8. On average, the mean of the board size is 16 with a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 
22. These results are similar to those of Godard and Shatt (2005). The mean of board members 
competency is about 38%. 
Table 5 shows that although 92.5% of firms in the sample have an independent audit committee 
and 73% have been audited by Big 4, 95% of firms choose the separation CEO and chairman 
roles. 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics 
  Variables  Obs  Proportion Mean Min Max Std deviation 
INDEP 392 - 0.4354683 0 0.9545454 0.2431233 
COMPETENT  392 - 0.3777735 0 0.9090909 0.2397666 
B.Size 392 - 16.04337 3 22 3.443465 
AUDIT.COM 392   0.925 - - - 0.0244831 
EXT.AUDIT 392   0.7295918 - - - 0.0224627 
Frequency 392 - 8.77551 3 15 2.94721 
SEP 392 0.95 - - - 0.0218984 
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The correlation analysis shows that corporate governance variables are negatively correlated 
with forecast error. It also shows that the interaction effect between IFRS and corporate 
governance variables are strongly and positively correlated with earnings forecast accuracy 
(negatively with forecast errors). This result showed that corporate governance is an important 
factor that contribute to the improvement of forecast earning accuracy after IFRS mandatory 
adoption. It is notable that board size is positively correlated with firm size (ln Assets), 
(AUDIT.COM), (SEP) and (Frequency), suggesting that large firms have large boards. It also 
indicates that large boards might create audit committee and might separate between the 
management and control. In addition, as the size of board increases, the more active it becomes. 
The results of this analysis show that all the correlation coefficients are below 0.7. Consequently, 
we note the absence of serious problem of multicollinearity. In addition, we calculate the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) which also tests for the presence of collinearity between the 
explanatory variables. VIF’s are below 1.8. Therefore, we can deduce the absence of any 
multicollinearity problems. 
4.2.3 Results of multivariate regression: 
Table 6 presents the results of three regressions used to test our second hypothesis. Regression 
2 adds industry Dummies to regression 1. Regression 3 presents the results controlling for both 
industry and year Dummies. Three regressions show a positive and very significant influence 
of the percentage of independent outside directors (INDEP) on reducing the forecast error. This 
finding implies that as the board members are independents, the more accurate the earnings 
forecasts are and the best quality of financial disclosure we have. This result is in line with those 
of Abott et al (2004) and Zéghal et al (2011) studies. Table 6 also shows that international 
competency of board members (COMPETENT) is negative (-1.66) and   significant at the 1% 
level. This finding is consistent with prior studies (Holm et al, 2012; Verriest et al, 2013).  
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Furthermore, from regression 1 to regression 3, board size, external audit quality and frequency 
of board meetings are strongly and negatively related to forecast error. The coefficients of these 
variables are respectively about -0.007 (p-value < 0.01), 0.024 (p-value < 0.01), 0.008 (p-value 
< 0.05). This is in line with prior findings that suggest large and active boards and Big 4 auditors 
contribute to the improvement of financial reporting quality which entail to better earnings 
forecast accuracy (Zéghal et al, 2011; Xie et al, 2003; Dimitropoulos et al, 2013). However, 
both separation of CEO and board chairman roles and audit committee are insignificantly 
associated with forecast errors. Hence, these variables do not appear to have any significant 
effect on increasing the level of earnings forecast accuracy. The possible explanation for these 
results is the lack of variation in practice relating to these variables among the companies in our 
sample. As evidenced by the descriptive analysis, most French firms now comply with 
corporate governance practice recommended by Viénot’s reports in striving to have 
independent audit committee and to separate the CEO and board Chairman roles.  
From regression 1 to regression 3, the earnings forecasts accuracy increase for firms with large, 
independent, competent and active boards. In addition, firms that have been audited by BIG 4 
disclose financial information of better quality which lead to more accurate earnings forecasts. 
According to table 6, when the interaction effect between IFRS and corporate governance 
variables are included within regression model, the effect of IFRS becomes highly significant. 
These results also provide support for hypothesis H2-1 concerning the positive and significant 
impact of IFRS mandatory adoption on analysts’ earnings forecasts accuracy for companies 
whose board is independent, competent and active. These findings are in line with previous 
studies (Verriest et al, 2013; Zéghal et al, 2011; Holm et al, 2012).  
According to hypothesis H2-4, table 6 shows a positive and very significant influence of the 
interaction term between IFRS and external audit quality (IFRS*BIG4) on increasing the 
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earning forecast accuracy. According to this table, the coefficient of this variable is negative (-
0.2032) in regression 1; (-0.2035) in regression 2 and (-0.3025) in regression 3. All these 
coefficients are significant at 1% level. Mandatory adoption of IFRS leads to a better 
improvement in analyst’s earnings forecasts accuracy when firm’s external audit is of high 
quality. The findings of this analysis also show that the effect of the interaction term between 
IFRS and board size (IFRS*board size) on analyst’s earnings forecast accuracy is positive and 
significant at 1% level. These results provide support to our hypotheses H2-5. They are 
consistent with prior research (Zéghal et al, 2011; Kent and Stewart, 2008). 
As opposed to hypothesis H2-2 and H2-3, the interaction terms between IFRS and audit 
committee (IFRS*AUDIT COMM) and between IFRS and roles separation of CEO and 
Chairman (IFRS*SEP) remain insignificantly correlated to analysts forecast accuracy. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Regression Results Model 2 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
IFRS  -0.1057* 
 (0.0455) 
-0.1081* 
 (0.0457) 
-0.2009* 
(0.0671) 
ln Assets -0.0010 
(0.0018) 
-0.0002 
(0.0019) 
0.0002 
(0.0020) 
σROE 0.0046** 
(0.0034) 
0.0048** 
(0.0034) 
0.0048** 
(0.0034) 
NEstimate -0.0019* 
(0.0021) 
-0.0011* 
(0.0022) 
-0.0016 
(0.0022) 
INDEP -1.0311*** 
(0.1941) 
-1.0316*** 
(0.1947) 
-1.0446*** 
(0.1956) 
COMPETENT -1.0600*** 
(0.1861) 
-1.0623*** 
(0.1864) 
-1.0650*** 
(0.1874) 
AUDIT.COM -0.0148 
(0.0100) 
-0.0150 
(0.0100) 
-0.0153*** 
(0.0101) 
SEP -0.0281 -0.0281 -0.0281 
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(0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0177) 
EXT.AUDIT -0.0234*** 
(0.0136) 
-0.0233*** 
(0.0136) 
-0.0241*** 
(0.0137) 
B.Size -0.0069*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0071*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0072*** 
(0.0012) 
Frequency -0.0076** 
(0.0066) 
-0.0079** 
(0.0067) 
-0.0081** 
(0.0067) 
IFRS*INDEP -1.0639*** 
(0.3982) 
-1.1064*** 
(0.4000) 
-1.1067*** 
(0.4027) 
IFRS*COMPETENT -1.0903*** 
(0.3745) 
-1.1258*** 
(0.3761) 
-1.1361*** 
(0.3792) 
IFRS*AUDIT.COM -(0.0024) 
(0.0172) 
-0.0032 
(0.0172) 
-0.0037 
(0.0173) 
IFRS*SEP -0.0347 
(0.0215) 
-0.0344 
(0.0216) 
0.0345 
(0.0218) 
IFRS*EXT.AUDIT -0.2032*** 
(0.0238) 
-0.2035*** 
(0.0239) 
-0.3025*** 
(0.0245) 
IFRS*B.Size -0.0014*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0016*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0017*** 
(0.0022) 
IFRS*Frequency -0.0033** 
(0.0101) 
-0.0027*** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0030*** 
(0.0103) 
Const 0.3164*** 
(0.0413) 
0.3849*** 
(0.0593) 
0.3848*** 
(0598) 
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No Yes 
Obs 392 392 392 
R. squared 0.3464 0.4509 0.5512 
Standard errors in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
 
From regression 1 to regression 3 most explanatory variables increase in significance and 
magnitude. Controlling for industry and year effect also implies an increase in R2 level from 
34.64% for regression 1 to 55.12% in regression 3. 
 
 
4.3 Robustness tests: 
To ensure the robustness of the results, we test the following model M3 for (2004-2006) period 
after discriminating between high and low corporate governance quality firms. We ranked our 
sample in increasing order of board members independence and competence. Then, we choose, 
for each year, the 20 highest corporate governance quality firms that have simultaneously the 
highest level of board independence and competence, BIG 4 auditors, independent audit 
committee and that separate CEO and Chairman roles. The 20 lowest corporate governance 
quality firms are those with lowest level of board independence and competence. These firms 
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also do not have separation of CEO and Chairman roles, independent audit committee or BIG 
4 auditors. The discriminating process is similar followed in this section is similar to the 
research methods used by Zéghal et al (2011) and Elshandidy et al (2013).   
 
         M3: µ0 + µ1 IFRSt,i+ µ2 CG Qualityt,i + µ3 IFRS*CG Qualityt,i+ µ4 Industry   
Dummiest, i + µ5 Year Dummiest,i+  ε i.t 
 
      Where:  
           CG Quality: dummy variable that take 1 if the corporate governance quality of the firm 
is high. i,e if the firm with highest board independence and competence has simultaneously BIG 
4 auditors, independent audit committee and separation of management and control roles. It 
takes 0 when firms with lowest board independence and competence do not have BIG 4 auditors 
or independent audit committee or separation of roles. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Regression results Model 3 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
IFRS  -0.0274* 
(0.0146) 
-0.0298** 
(0.0146) 
-0.1337** 
(0.0201) 
CG Quality -0.1484*** 
(0.0357) 
-0.1552*** 
(0.0377) 
-0.1642*** 
(0.0468) 
IFRS* CG Quality -0.0290*** 
(0.0206) 
-0.0370*** 
(0.0206) 
-0.0380*** 
(0.0466) 
Const 0.1491*** 
(0.0253) 
0.1833*** 
(0.0690) 
0.1809*** 
(0.0693) 
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No  No  Yes 
Obs 80 80 80 
R. squared 0.2745 0.2911 02961 
Standard errors in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
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Table 7 presents the results of regression analysis for model 3 in 2004 (before IFRS) and 2006 
(after IFRS). We focused on only to two years to facilitate the selection procedure of subsample. 
Regression 2 presents the results with Industry dummies. It shows that IFRS has negative and 
significant effect on analysts forecast error (-0.0298; p-value < 0.05). Conversely, Regression1 
shows that IFRS has negative but less significant effect on forecast error. This table also shows 
that corporate governance quality is strongly and positively correlated with analysts’ forecasts 
accuracy. From regression 1 to regression 3, the effect of the interaction term between IFRS 
and corporate governance quality (IFRS*CG Quality) on earnings forecasts accuracy is positive 
and significant at 1% level. Regression 3 shows that this variable increases in magnitude 
compared to regression 1. Overall, the findings are consistent with our previous results showing 
that mandatory adoption of IFRS improves the analysts’ earnings forecasts accuracy for firms 
with good corporate governance. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this research was to examine if IFRS mandatory adoption by French companies 
contributed to the improvement of analysts’ earnings forecasts accuracy. In addition, we 
analyzed enforcement factors that contributed to the implementation of IFRS. 
Consistent with previous study, our results show that mandatory adoption of IFRS by French 
companies has improved the disclosure quality; particularly the accuracy of earnings forecasts. 
In addition, the independence and international competency, the quality of external audit, the 
board size and the frequency of meeting are important factors for the implementation of IFRS 
in France. These results are in line with prior research (Zéghal et al, 2011, Verriest et al, 2013; 
Dimitropoulos et al, 2013; Holm et al, 2012). 
Our study contributes to the current debate about the quality of IFRS in several ways. First, 
unlike previous research that focus on the effect of voluntary adoption of IFRS (Barth et al, 
2008; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005), our paper examines the IFRS mandatory adoption. 
Hence, this allows us to avoid the sample selection bias. Second, our paper examines the IFRS 
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enforcement factors that guarantee effective implementation of international accounting 
standards which improve the earnings forecasts accuracy. 
In highlighting the existence of improvement in financial reporting quality, our results should 
be of interest to all parties seeking to evaluate the costs and benefits of IFRS mandatory 
adoption. We also expect our results to be of interest to academics involved in researching 
progress with international accounting harmonization, to the French regulatory and supervisory 
authorities, financial analysts, investors, government, accounting setters and practitioners since 
the study highlights the factors that have contributed to the enforcement of IFRS in relatively 
newer context of IFRS adoption such as France. 
These findings should also be relevant for international regulatory authorities and institutions 
involved in the process (e.g. securities markets, IASB, European commission) since the results 
provide examples of how firms required to apply IFRS have approached the process in a 
continental European accounting system recognized by its regulatory rigidity and legal outlook. 
They may help the IASB in its efforts to encourage the worldwide adoption of IFRS. They 
could be relevant for many countries especially those that not yet decide and hope to move to 
IFRS.  
 
Further, our study presents some limitations. We focused on value relevance of financial 
statements approximated by earnings forecasts accuracy. So, we did not refer in this study to 
other financial reporting quality attribute such as reliability, comparability, timeliness. 
Therefore, future research could analyse the impact of IFRS mandatory adoption on these other 
disclosure dimensions. Moreover, this study examined only the corporate governance as 
enforcement factor that contribute to the implementation of IFRS. We did not examine other 
enforcement factors such as dependence on foreign financial markets, culture and institutional 
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factors. Finally, we examine only the French context. It’s interesting for future research to study 
the effect of IFRS mandatory adoption for several countries. 
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